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Abstract 
Corruption is widely believed to have an adverse effect on the economic performance of a country. 
However, many East and Southeast Asian countries either achieved or currently are achieving 
impressively rapid economic growth despite widespread corruption- the so-called East-Asian-
Paradox. A common feature of these countries was that they were autocracies. We re-examine the 
corruption-growth relationship, in light of the East-Asian-Paradox. We examine the role of 
political regimes, in mediating corruption-growth relationship using panel data over one hundred 
countries for the period 1984-2016. We find clear evidence that corruption-growth relationship 
differs by the type of political regime, and the growth enhancing effect of corruption is more likely 
in autocracies than in democracies.  The marginal effect analysis shows that in strongly autocratic 
countries, higher corruption may actually lead to significantly higher growth, while this is not the 
case in democracies. Alternatively, democracy is not good for growth if there is a high level of 
perceived corruption. We provide suggestive evidence that the mechanism by which corruption is 
growth enhancing in autocracies is through the perceived credibility of commitment of ruling 
political elites to economic freedom, thereby providing confidence to the firms to invest, leading 
to long-term growth.  
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The Corruption-Growth Relationship: Does the Political Regime Matter? 
 
1. Introduction 
How does corruption affect economic growth? The theoretical literature provides no clear 
guidance on this issue.  One strand of the theoretical literature argues that corruption increases 
economic growth by enabling investors to avoid bureaucratic delay through the use of “speed 
money” and by encouraging lowly paid government employees to work harder if they could 
supplement their income by levying bribes (Leff 1964, Huntington 1968, Lui, 1985, De Soto 1989, 
Egger and Winner 2005). Another strand of the theoretical literature contends that corruption has 
a negative effect on economic growth by reducing investment, both in physical and human capital 
(Mauro 1995, Keefer and Knack 1997,  Reinikka and Svensson 2005) and by leading to a 
misallocation of public expenditures away from growth-enhancing areas (such as education and 
health) towards areas which are less productivity enhancing, but are more corruption-intensive 
(such as large and expensive infrastructural projects) (Mauro 1997, Tanzi and Davoodi 1997). In 
this paper, we test for the corruption-growth relationship by using panel data for over one hundred 
countries from 1984 to 2016, allowing this relationship to differ by political regime. 
A vast empirical literature has studied the impact of corruption on growth. For example, 
Mauro (1995) finds that a one standard deviation increase in bureaucratic integrity will lead to a 
five percentage point increase in investment and an increase in the annual growth rate by half a 
percentage point. Fisman and Svensson (2001) estimate that a one per cent increase in corruption 
leads to a three per cent reduction in firm growth. Mo (2001) finds that a one percentage increase 
in the corruption level reduces the growth rate by about 0.72 per cent. Pellegrini and Gerlagh 
(2004) find that a one standard deviation decrease in corruption leads to an increase in growth of 
1 per cent per year, for a given initial income level.  
Similarly, there is a large empirical literature on the effect of democracy on economic 
growth. In one of the early empirical contributions to this literature, Barro (1996) finds that the 
overall effects of democracy on growth is weakly negative using repeated cross-sections for 84 
countries, with growth rates of GDP per capita averaged over 1965–75, 1975–85, and 1985–90. A 
similar finding is obtained by Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), also with cross-sectional data. On the 
other hand, Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005), Persson and Tabellini (2007), and Papaioannou and 
Siouroinis (2008) find a positive effect using panel data. More recently, Acemoglu et al. (2014) 
find a sizeable and robust effect of democracy on economic growth using annual panel data and 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) methods for 175 countries for 1960–2010.  
In this paper we look at the joint effect of corruption and the type of political regime 
(dictatorship vs. democracy), on economic growth. In other words, the joint effect examines if 
corruption-growth relationship varies in different political systems i.e. in autocracy and 
democracy. A set of studies have highlighted the so-called ‘East Asian Paradox’, where countries 
in North and South East Asia grew rapidly in spite of high levels of corruption (Campos 2002; 
Rock and Bonnett 2004 and Gill and Kharas 2007). The observed positive relationship between 
corruption and growth has been attributed, at least in part, to the authoritarian regimes prevalent 
in these countries, which made sure that corruption was growth-enhancing. On the other hand, 
there are several autocratic regimes, mainly in Africa and Latin America, where high rates of 
corruption had a deleterious effect on economic growth (Bates 1981; Bratton and Van de Walle 
1994; Haber 2002).  
To examine whether the corruption–growth relationship is different in autocracies that in 
democracies we test for the relationship allowing it to differ by political regime. We use panel data 
for over 100 countries from 1984–2016. To test for the mediating effect of political regime on the 
corruption–growth relationship, we include an interaction term between our measure of democracy 
and of corruption, along with including the measures of corruption and democracy directly in the 
regressions we estimate.  
We find clear and unambiguous evidence that the corruption–growth relationship differs 
by political regime, and that the growth enhancing effect of corruption is more likely in autocracies 
than in democracies. The findings support the argument that credible commitment necessary for 
investment and growth is more likely in autocracies than democracies, and that corruption per se 
may not have a negative effect on growth if the deals made by politicians and firms are seen as 
credible. 
The rest of the paper is in three sections. The next section discusses literature review, 
Section 3 presents our empirical model and the data to be used in the empirical analysis. Section 
4 describes the results of the empirical analysis and Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
 
2. The Relationship Between Corruption, Political Regimes and Economic Growth 
In this section, we review the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between 
corruption, political regimes and economic growth.  
From a theoretical standpoint, it is not clear whether the corruption–growth relationship 
will differ between democracies and autocracies, and if so, in which way. On one hand, the 
postulated negative effect of corruption on growth may be lower in an autocracy than in a 
democracy if the centralization of authority in the former regime leads to more efficient bribe-
taking and lower loss of output (Ehrlich and Lui 1999; Sheifer and Vishny 1993). On the other 
hand, the possibility of the greater secrecy in corruption in an autocracy (as corruption includes all 
the actions taken to influence rule enforcers (Campos and Giovannoni, 2017) allows for less 
growth enhancing public and private investments which are not as corruption intensive than low 
value projects in areas such as defence and infrastructure (Shleifer and Vishny 1993), while the 
greater accountability pressures in a democracy limits the possibility of such growth-retarding 
investments. Aidt et al. (2008) provide a theoretical model which shows that in regimes where 
citizens cannot hold their political leaders to account (as in an autocracy), the political leadership 
may try and extract as much rent as possible from the formal sector, leading to an increase in the 
size of the informal sector, with a consequent negative effect on growth.   
The heterodox economics literature has taken a different standpoint on the role of the 
political regime to mediate the effect of corruption on growth. It has argued that corruption is 
unlikely to negatively affect economic growth, especially in autocracies (Khan and Jomo 2000). 
In some autocratic regimes, where ruling elites may have long-term time horizons, politicians are 
able to make the credible commitments to firms not to expropriate all of the rents that accrue from 
the investment decision, though some rent-sharing may exist in the form of bribes from firms to 
politicians (Bardhan 1997; Khan 1996). Thus, bribe-taking by politicians from firms may not have 
a deleterious effect on investment and growth as deals offered by politicians to firms are likely to 
be ‘ordered’ — firms can be confident that politicians will deliver on the deals that they have 
entered into with them (Pritchett and Werker 2013; Sen 2013). On the other hand, in democratic 
regimes, with frequent change of ruling parties, commitments made by politicians to firms are less 
likely to be credible. Here, bribe-taking by politicians is associated with deals that are ‘disordered’ 
as firms are less likely to believe that politicians are able to deliver on the deals offered to them. 
In this case, corruption is likely to have a deterring effect on growth.   
The positive view in the heterodox literature on the growth-enhancing nature of 
corruption among autocracies, draws primarily from the East Asian experience, and is not 
consistent with the experience of autocracies in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, which have 
observed high rates of corruption and low rates of economic growth (Ndulu and O’Connell 1999, 
Khan 2006). Using case-study evidence from four African countries, Coolidge and Rose-
Ackerman (1999) argue that where the autocrat is not confident of the length of his tenure (due to 
the fear of deposition from other factions in the ruling elite such as the military), he may engage 
in rent extraction from the private sector, leading to high corruption and low growth. In other 
words, if the autocrat has a sufficiently short time horizon, it would be in “his interest to confiscate 
the property of his subjects, to abrogate any contracts he has signed in borrowing money from 
them, and generally to ignore the long-run economic consequences of his choices” (Olson 1993 p. 
572).  
This suggests that the crucial distinguishing feature between the authoritarian regimes in 
East Asia as compared to the authoritarian regimes in other parts of the developing world is that 
the leaders in East Asia had an interest in providing a stable economic environment for the private 
sector to take long-term investment decisions, even though the relations between the state and the 
private sector was of the “crony capitalist” variety. Such collusive relations between government 
and business provided security for corrupt payments, so that corruption acted as “the grease in the 
wheels” in these countries. Therefore, the key mechanism by which corruption was growth 
enhancing in East Asian autocracies as compared to other autocracies was the East Asian autocrat’s 
credible commitment to economic freedom and pro-business policies, thereby providing 
confidence to the firms to invest, leading to long-term growth (Saha et al., 2014).1 We test for the 
presence of this mechanism explicitly in our empirical analysis.  
                                                            
1 In many market-oriented economies, government restrictions on economic activity breed rents in various forms, and 
people often compete for the rents (Krueger, 1974), hence engendering varying degrees of corruption. Rose-Ackerman 
(1978) first argued that competition between officials keeps the level of bribe relatively low and may eliminate entirely 
due to the possibility of overlapping jurisdictions, i.e. low bribe returns and the honesty of some officials may push 
the market-clearing bribe-price still lower, inducing other officials to give up corruption. Hence, economic 
liberalisation can foster economic competition and ease of doing business and promote growth. Some observed 
evidence support this view. Some countries with a very low level of democracy enjoy a very high level of economic 
freedom and growth, say South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s and China. On the other hand, in spite of India's high 
level of democracy, it experiences a low level of economic freedom and a high level of corruption.  
   There are few quantitative cross-country studies on the inter-relationship between 
corruption, political regimes and growth. Mendez and Sepulveda (2006) find that there is a non-
monotonic relationship between corruption and growth, with corruption beneficial for economic 
growth at low levels of incidence and detrimental at high levels of incidence. They also find that 
in political regimes that are “not free”, corruption does not affect economic growth in the same 
fashion as for “free” political regimes, and that the non-monotonic relationship between corruption 
and growth is observed only in “free” countries. Assiotis and Sylwester (2014) find that while 
corruption does have a negative effect on growth, this is more likely to be observed in autocracies. 
Similarly, Meon and Sekkat (2005) show that while corruption has a negative effect on growth, it 
is particularly true for countries with weak governance quality (see also Berggren et al. 2012).  
The argument that corruption may be beneficial to growth in autocracies as compared to 
democracies finds strong support in qualitative country case-studies. In the case of South Korea, 
an authoritarian regime since 1963, with the coming to power of the military general Park Chung-
heee, till democratization in 1987, there was wide spread corruption in the period of authoritarian 
rule in 1963-1987 (see Figure 1). This was also period of rapid growth of the Korean economy. 
During the autocratic period, personal ties between the business elite and the political elite and the 
mutual advantage that the system of exchanging bribes for political favours to the Korean 
conglomerates provided to both political and economic elites underpinned institutions of credible 
commitment (“ordered deals”) in Korea all through the 1960s to the 1980s, and was crucial for 
Korea’s success in the early stage of growth, in a context where the rule of law in Korea was vague 
and seldom enforced (Kang 2002a, 2002b). As Figure 2 makes clear, high growth in Korea in the 
1980s (and earlier) coincided with high levels of corruption. Therefore, in South Korea in the 
1960s and 1970s, “development and money politics proceeded hand in hand (Kang 2002a, p. 185). 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
China is also an example of an autocratic country which has witnessed high rates of 
economic growth along with high rates of corruption (see Figures 1 and 2). The corruption that 
China witnessed took the form of profit sharing where both elites and non-elites benefited from 
wealth creation in their jurisdictions (Ang 2020, p. 12). As Ang (2019), argues, corruption spurred 
                                                            
 
“politically connected politically connected capitalists to feverishly invest and build, while 
enabling politicians to achieve their development targets and ascend career ladders”. Therefore, 
the Chinese leadership took strong methodological measures to curb the growth-damaging effects 
of corruption.     
Zimbabwe provides an interesting counter-example of an autocracy which was highly 
corrupt but where corruption was growth-retarding, unlike the case of South Korea and China (as 
Figure 1 shows, Zimbabwe has remained an autocracy since the 1960s).  Here, the ruling elite 
placed its own political survival and control above policies of economic growth. Thus, 
Zimbabwe’s ruling party, the ZANU-PF, under the leadership of Robert Mugabe, used “the 
strength of the inherited state apparatus to suppress political opposition and to curtail the 
independent economic power of business elites” (Bratton and Masunungure 2011, p. 3.). At the 
same time, the quest for political power led to open corruption and nepotism (Mandaza 1986). 
Therefore, Zimbabwe illustrates the example of an autocracy where economic freedom was 
curtailed, leading to low economic growth, co-existing with high levels of corruption (as evident 
in Figure 2). 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In contrast to South Korea, China, and Zimbabwe, India has been a democracy ever since 
it became independent in 1947 (Figure 1). In the first three decades after independence, the Indian 
government created one of the most comprehensively controlled and regulated economies after 
independence. As a consequence, “the Indian elite developed a highly sophisticated mode of 
discrete lobbying designed to achieve particularistic benefits from the new permit, licence, quota 
raj. Each major business house established the equivalent of an industrial embassy designed to act 
as a listening post, liaison office and lobbying agency to deal with political and bureaucratic 
decision makers” (Kochanek 1996, p. 157). There was very little mutual confidence between the 
government and business sector, leading to a lack of trust by the business sector on the deals that 
the state might offer to them. As Bhagwati (1993) points out, ‘the industrial-cum-licensing system 
… had degenerated into a series of arbitrary, indeed inherently arbitrary, decisions where, for 
instance, one activity would be chosen over another simply because the administering bureaucrats 
were so empowered, and indeed obligated, to choose’ (p. 50). This led to a “disordered deals” 
environment that contributed significantly to low rates of private investment and slow economic 
growth all through the 1960s and 1970s (Kar and Sen 2016). As Bardhan (1984) argues, the 
tensions that were inherent in India’s democracy that led to the management of conflict in the 
ruling coalition/dominant proprietary classes (comprising the industrial capitalists, the agrarian 
elite and the professional class)  resulted in an increasing share of non-development expenditures 
such as subsidies to the dominant proprietary classes.  This left limited resources for productive 
capital formation by the public sector, thereby constraining economic growth. Therefore, in the 
Indian case, while there was high rates of corruption (see Figure 2), this did not lead to high 
economic growth as in the South Korean and Chinese cases.  
These case-studies show that the effects of corruption on growth is likely to differ by 
political regime, and autocracies such as China and South Korea may have certain characteristics 
(a high level of economic freedom) that may make the effect of corruption on growth more benign 
as compared to a democracy like India, and autocracies which lack economic freedom such as 
Zimbabwe. We investigate this proposition next more systematically using cross-country panel 
data. 
 
3.   Empirical model, methodology and data 
This section discusses model, methodology and data used to explore the association between 
corruption and growth. 
 
3.1 Model 
Our panel data analysis based on standard economic growth model expresses the rate of per capita 
income (growth) as dependent on various macroeconomic factors such as investment, population 
growth and average school enrolment. To examine the role of corruption and political regimes, we 
follow the standard approach of estimating growth regressions, by developing a Barro-style 
augmented growth model as an extension of Solow (1956). In the original Solow model, 
output/income in an economy over the long-term depends on its available factors of production 
and technology. Following Barro (1991), we extend the Solow growth model by including 
corruption, democracy and the interaction term to explore the joint effects of corruption and regime 
type on economic growth. We also include openness (economic freedom) and money supply to 
measure the impact of globalization and macroeconomic stability in a country. The interaction 
effects measuring the effect of corruption on economic growth in different regime types is the 
main focus of this study.  
The base model using panel data over the period 1984–2016 is structured as follows: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =∝0+∝1 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +∝2 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +∝3 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +∝4 log (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
∝5 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +∝6 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +∝7 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +∝8 𝐷𝐷2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                            (1) 
 
where, LRGDPPC is log of real per capita gross domestic product as measure of economic growth, 
CORR is corruption, DEMO is democracy indices, CAP is capital per capita, RND is research and 
development, EDU is educational attainment, OPEN (EF) is trade openness (economic freedom), 
M2GDP is money supply to GDP ratio, Ɛ is error term. Subscripts i is country and t is for time.  
The sign and significance of α3 is of interest, which captures the interaction effect of 
corruption and democracy on log of per capita income. In addition, the marginal effects of 
corruption and democracy on income are computed as follows: 
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
=∝1+∝3 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                                    (2a) 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
=∝2+∝3 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                                                      (2b) 
 
Equation (2a) demonstrates the marginal impact of corruption on income in the presence of 
democracy. If α3<0, then equation (2a) implies that a one unit increase in CORR yields a greater 
reduction in income as the degree of democracy expands.2 Alternatively, an increase in corruption 
level enhances growth when countries are strongly autocratic or less democratic. Contrarily, if 
α3>0 a higher level of corruption increases growth with a greater democracy. In other words 
marginal effect of corruption and democracy reveals that an increase in the level of corruption on 
income per capita growth depends on the level of political regime, the impact of corruption on 
growth is favourable in autocracy and the opposite is true in greater democracy. Likewise, equation 
(2b) is the marginal effect of democracy in the presence of a corrupt system. If α3<0 and exceeds 
α2>0 then a one unit increase in the level of democracy lowers growth in a more corrupt nation.  
                                                            
2 The corruption index ranges from zero to six and a higher value indicates a higher level of corruption. 
Following neo-classical growth theory, it is expected that a greater stock of capital per capita, 
higher educational achievement and more research and development should boost income growth 
(Mankiw et al.; 1992, Romer 1990). Hence, α4, α5 and α6 are expected to be positive. Rent-seeking 
theory and cognitive rules in the context of a market for ideas suggest that the impact of open 
market should have positive impact on growth (Krueger 1974 and Greif and Mokyr 2017), we 
expect α7 to be positive. Finally, following basic macroeconomic model, circular flow diagram 
suggests a greater money supply increases income as it is an injection. Hence, the expected sign 
of α8 is positive. 
This is to note here that as our empirical model uses panel fixed effects, different from Mauro 
(1995), which uses GDP per capita growth rate as a dependent variable and includes initial level 
of GDP per capita as an explanatory variable in the model. The Mauro growth model analyses 
corruption-growth relationship for a cross-section of around 70 countries for the average per capita 
growth over 1960-1985, while we use panel data in our estimation. However, as a robustness 
check, we replace GDP per capita with its growth rate as the dependent variable with initial level 
of GDP per capita as a control variable and the estimations are run using OLS (for the cross-section 
of countries for the average growth per capita over 1984 to 2016) and panel period fixed effects. 
In addition, two-way fixed effects are estimated with GDP per capita as dependent variable with 
lagged GDP per capita as a control variable. For further robustness checks and to address the 
endogeniety issue, dynamic-panel-System-GMM with GDP per capita growth as the dependent 
variable is also estimated.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
In order to test the proposed hypothesis, a panel estimation technique is used for over one hundred 
countries for the period 1984–2016. We first start employing an ordinary least square estimation 
with the average values of each variable for the period 1984–2016. Following Saha and Gounder 
(2013), a seven-period panel (i.e., five 5-year average for 1995–2013 and a 3-year average for 
2014–16) is estimated to defecate potential business cycle effects that are assumed to be present 
in annual data. Then we examine the fixed effects model with country and time specific variations 
in corruption–growth relationship. Next we test its validity, comparing the variances of parameters 
obtained from the random effect model using the Hausman test. According to Baltagi (2008) and 
Basu et al. (2019), all estimators in the fixed effects (FE) model even with small number of cross 
sections N, are consistent as time (t) increases and approaches to infinity. In the random effects 
model, with the regression error term vi,t = ui + εi,t,   where ui  is the time-invariant random individual 
effect in addition to εi,t error term denoting all other missing elements. Furthermore, in both models 
(random and fixed effects) it is assumed that all explanatory variables are independent from error 
terms vit, ui, and identically distributed (i.i.d) and assumed to be normally distributed. The results 
are presented after correcting for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation with robust standard 
errors. 
Also, while the simple least squares panel data model with FE provide an important insight 
on the coefficients of interest, they can render biased estimates due to the potential problem of 
endogeneity between several of our variables such as growth and democracy, growth and 
corruption, which can cause the error terms to be correlated with dependent variables.3 Although 
a vector of control variables is used to reduce the problem of endogeneity, there still could be 
omitted variables that cause changes in both corruption and growth.  
There is a clear reverse causality issue between the institutional variables (corruption, 
democracy and the interaction term between corruption and democracy), and the dependent 
variable -economic growth. The usual approach to resolve the endogeneity issue is to use two-
stage-least square which uses instrumental variable that is correlated with the independent variable 
but not with the dependent variable. However, it is extremely difficult to find efficient instruments. 
Following Mauro (1995), the potential issue of simultaneous causation is addressed here using the 
two-stage least square (TSLS) procedure and employing instrumental variables that may affect 
institutional variables but not affect growth directly. Ethnic tensions (ET), which focuses on the 
degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions,  is used 
as an instrument for institutional variable such as corruption. This is similar to Mauro (1995) who 
uses ethnolinguistic fractionalization as instruments for corruption and points out that the extent 
to which countries are fractionalized along ethnolinguistic lines is exogenous and unrelated to 
economic variables other than through its effects on institutional efficiency.4 The raw data also 
                                                            
3 Democracy and corruption are endogenously determined in the sense that they are both correlated with exogenous 
shocks that affect the growth of real GDP per capita. 
4 However, ethnolinguistic fractionalization is only available for cross-section of countries, which Mauro (1995) uses 
in the cross-section studies. In contrast, Ethnic tension variable is available over time and suitable for panel data 
analysis. 
confirms that the correlation between real GDP per capita growth and ethnic tensions is -0.072 but 
the correlation between ethnic tension and corruption is 0.341 (Appendix Table A3). We also use 
lag of the other right-hand side variables as instruments.5 
For a further robustness check, System-GMM-Dynamic-Panel is also employed to address 
the endogeneity issue. System GMM estimators improve efficiency of estimates by using extra 
moment conditions that ‘rely on certain stationarity conditions of the initial observation.’ (see, 
Blundell and Bond, 1998).  Identification is based on first-differencing and using lagged values of 
the endogenous variables as instruments. The system-GMM estimator (GMM-SYS) is composed 
of a difference equation instrumented with lagged levels and additionally a level equation, which 
is estimated using lagged differences as instruments (Bond et al. 2001; Rajan and Subramanian 
2008). Hence, System-GMM-Dynamic-Panel is used to address the endogeneity issue for the 
robustness check. We test the instrument validity by using Hansen’s J statistic of over-identifying 
restrictions.   
 
3.3 Data 
The empirical model employs macroeconomic data, corruption indices and democracy indicators 
to test the proposed hypothesis. 
 
Corruption data 
The major obstacles of comparative studies of corruption have been the lack of a general definition 
of corruption and the absence of objective cross-national data on corrupt behaviour given its illegal 
and secret nature. The subjective measure of corruption is used as a principal measure, source from 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The ICRG index is constructed by Political Risk 
Services.6 It measures the corruption within the political system that threatens foreign investment 
by distorting the economic and financial environment and reducing the efficiency of government 
and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than 
ability. The ICRG corruption index (CORR) has been widely used in the literature and it is 
                                                            
5 The results are available upon request from the authors. 
6 The definition of corruption used is the misuse of public office for private enrichment in this study. See the Political 
Risk Services (PRS) http://www.prsgroup.com/countrydata.aspx. 
published since 1984.7 For simplicity and ease of exposition, the ICRG index has been converted 
into a scale from zero (least corrupt) to six (most corrupt). 
We also use Transparency International’s (TI’s) Corruption perception index (CPI) for 
robustness check. The CPI index is a composite index based on individual surveys from different 
sources. The index is rescaled and ranges from zero to ten and a higher value indicates a higher 
level of corruption. The index is available since 1995.  
 
Democracy indicators 
Like corruption, democracy also suffers from the problem of measurement. The measurement of 
democracy is disputed due to the problems of conceptualization, measurement and aggregation 
and no single index offers a satisfactory response to these problems, and even the best indices have 
significant weaknesses (Coppedge 2002; Munck and Verkuilen 2002). For the purpose of this 
study, ICRG democratic accountability is used as a principal measure of democracy (DEMO). It 
is a measure of how responsive government is to its citizens and it is more likely that a less 
responsive government will fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly violently in a 
non-democratic one. The score for the democracy index ranges from zero to six, higher values 
signalling dominated democracy. The Polity2 institutionalized measure of democracy index from 
Polity 4 dataset is used as an alternative measure of democracy. The index is based on the 
competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive 
recruitment and constraints on the chief executives.8 It measures the degree of democracy and 
autocracy. The most widely used Polity score combines the scores on the democracy and autocracy 
indices to a single regime indicator. The score captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-
point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). For ease of 
explanation, we rescaled the index from 1 to 21 and a higher value indicates a higher level of 
democracy. 
 
 
 
                                                            
7 See Swaleheen (2011) and Dal BÓ and Rossi (2007) for details. 
8 See http://www3.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/PolityIVUsersManualv2002.pdf for details. 
Macroeconomic data 
Real GDP per capita is the dependent variable. The real GDP per capita, capital formation, research 
and development expenditure to GDP, educational attainment and money supply (M2) to GDP 
data are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database. For the 
purpose of the study economic freedom index is used along with openness variable and the data is 
from the Heritage Foundation. Ethnic tension data for the instrumental variable is from ICRG 
index, Political Risk Services. Due to missing data, the total number of countries used in any 
regression ranges from 103 to 136 for the period 1984–2016. The summary statistics and data 
description and sources are presented in Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2, respectively. 
 
4. Empirical results 
We start our investigation with the Kernel-fit of the scatter-plots of the relationship between per 
capita real GDP with corruption democracy. The Kernel-fit line depicting the relationship between 
LGDPPC and CORR indicates that corruption lowers per capita income (Figure 3a). In other 
words, a higher income growth is associated with low levels of corruption. For instance, the 
average level of income per capita for the period 1984–2016 in China is around US$2520, and the 
corruption score is 2.26, whereas, the income per capita and corruption level in Congo Democratic 
Republic are US$456 (approx.) and 5.26, respectively.9 The results support the common claim that 
less corruption enhances economic growth.10 Both ICRG and Transparency International 
corruption perception indices support the results. 
However, Figure 3b shows a U-shaped relationship between LGDPPC and DEMO (for 
both the democracy indices) suggesting that some autocratic countries are performing well in terms 
of growth along with their democratic counterparts. In other words, there is a high level of income 
both at a greater level of autocracy and democracy but the income level decreases at the transition 
stage in the process of democratization. On the one hand, countries with greater democracy exhibit 
higher income (such as Australia and United Kingdom). Likewise, countries with stronger 
autocracy also demonstrate a higher income (for example, Brunei and Saudi Arabia). On the other 
hand, per capita income levels of the transition countries (i.e., from autocracy to democracy) such 
as Russia and Tunisia are quite low.  However, countries with a very high level of democracy 
                                                            
9 A higher value of corruption indicates more corruption. 
10 See for example Mauro (1995). 
enjoy very high income compared to the strong autocratic countries. This result supports the 
widespread argument in the existing democracy literature that democracy provides the best 
opportunities for growth (e.g., Jalles 2010; and Barro 1991). However, in order to get the firmer 
support of the results one should rigorously test whether the change in coefficients is significant 
or not. In addition, we also explore the interaction effect of corruption and democracy on economic 
growth to estimate the joint effect of democracy and corruption on growth. 
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.1 Regression results 
The estimated regression coefficients using ICRG corruption and democracy indices for the base 
model in equation 1 are reported in Table 1. The OLS regression results without controls suggest 
that corruption coefficient is negative and significant but the coefficients for democracy and the 
interaction term are positive but insignificant (column 1, Table 1). However, the results with 
control variables show that the coefficient of corruption is positive but not significant indicating 
that there is not enough evidence that corruption is growth enhancing. The coefficient for 
democracy is positive and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that a greater democracy 
enhances growth (column 2, Table 1). This result supports the findings of Alfonso-Gil et al., (2014) 
and Benyishay et al., (2010), which show that movements toward higher levels of civil liberty are 
associated with higher economic growth rates. Moreover, Cooray et al., (2017) finds that a free 
press improves government’s accountability to the society and leads to better governance mostly 
in the developed countries. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The coefficient for the interaction term between corruption and democracy is negative and 
significant at the 1% level of significance illustrating that democracy and corruption together have 
significant damaging effects on economic growth in a country (column 2, Table 1). It suggests that 
the effect of corruption on growth is less positive as the level of democracy expands. A one unit 
increase in corruption level reduces log real GDP per capita by 155%. Based on equation (2a), the 
interaction effect of corruption on real GDP per capita at the mean score of democracy of 3.81 is 
−5.85, which is significant, suggesting that a one standard deviation point increase in CORR 
increases economic growth by 6.51 points at the mean democracy index. The impact of corruption 
on economic growth demonstrates some mixed effects. If a country is more autocratic then more 
corruption is associated with higher growth. Alternatively, the effect of corruption on growth is 
less positive as the level of democracy expands. On the other hand, the interaction effect of 
democracy on real GDP per capita (equation 2a) at the mean corruption score 3.07 is 0.02 
indicating that a one standard deviation point increase in democracy (DEM) increases economic 
growth by 0.028 points at the mean corruption index. Like corruption, democracy also illustrates 
the mixed effects on income growth, democracy stimulates (dampen) growth when corruption is 
low (high). In other words, corruption shows positive effect if a country is more autocratic. But if 
a country has more corruption then more democracy is growth inhibiting. The results of these two 
interactive factors are interpreted in detail in the partial (marginal) effect estimation.  
The panel least square and two-way fixed effects results both with and without control 
variables confirm the OLS results that corruption is growth enhancing in autocracies (columns 4-
5 and 7-8, Table 1). Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient of the interaction term increases 
after including the control variables. Control variables are expected in signs, such as higher stock 
of capital per capita, educational attainment, research and development expenditure, more open 
economy and money supply increase the rate of per capita income. One should note that due to the 
large number of missing values of research and development expenditure data, which reduces the 
number of observations significantly, we reported the results without research and expenditure 
variable. The results remain same when the ICRG democracy index is replaced by Polity2 measure 
of institutionalized democracy indicator (Polity 4 dataset) (Table 2).  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.2 The East Asian Paradox 
East Asian countries present a number of puzzles and paradoxes mainly due to the fact that the 
growth rates in East Asia have greatly exceeded all other regions of the world. The current 
economic wisdom holds that, ceteris paribus, higher levels of corruption should be associated with 
lower rates of development (e.g. Mauro, 1995). East Asian countries do not follow the wisdom 
and the economic success is paradoxical because most of the countries in the region have been 
plagued by relatively serious high-level corruption throughout the period of rapid growth and the 
political environment in the region is mostly autocratic. The average level of corruption and GDP 
per capita growth over the period 1984-2016 in Table 3, show that some East Asian countries enjoy 
a high level of economic growth in spite of having a high level of corruption (such as China and 
South Korea). The East Asian paradox is tested using interaction among East Asian dummy 
variable and corruption and democracy variables. The fixed effect result confirms that the 
interaction effect between corruption and democracy is positive (column 9, Table 1) in East Asian 
countries confirming the paradox that countries in East Asian countries grow faster despite of high 
level of corruption and restricted democracy. Both ICRG and Polity 2 measure of institutional 
democracy indices support these results. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.3 Robustness Tests 
Dependent variable GDP per capita growth 
 
The results using GDP per capita growth as dependent variable using the Barro type growth 
regression with initial GDP per capita as independent variable confirms the convergence theory of 
growth as the coefficient of initial GDP per capita (Barro 1991) is negative and significant at the 
1% level (not reported due to the limited space).  The result suggests that if a country’s GDP per 
capita in 1984 is higher than others then the country’s growth rate over the period is less than other 
countries. The interaction coefficient is negative and significant, which is consistent with our 
earlier results that the impact of corruption on growth reduces as a country’s democracy level 
expands.11 Furthermore, the results suggest that corruption increases growth in East-Asian 
countries and this result is significant and positive in OLS, panel period fixed effect and two-way 
fixed effect. 
 
Two-stage Least Squares  
The Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimates show that ethnic tensions and lagged variables are 
good predictors of corruption and also confirm the panel least square and two-way fixed effects 
                                                            
11 The results are available upon request from the authors. 
estimates that joint effect of corruption and democracy is growth deterring, although the interaction 
term is not significant. The first stage estimation show that ethnic tension coefficient is positive 
and significant at the 1% percent level indicating that corruption level increases significantly as 
ethnic tensions increase in a country. This result is consistent with Mauro (1995). The first-stage 
F-value is 175.08 which is greater than 10, suggesting that the instruments are not weak.12  
System GMM results are robust and provide a strong evidence that higher corruption does 
itself increase growth when countries are more autocratic (Appendix Table A4). The coefficients 
of the interaction terms are negative and significant for both ICRG and Polity measure of 
democracy, confirming our earlier results that corruption is growth enhancing in autocracies 
(columns 1-4). The estimated coefficient for current per capita GDP growth with respect to its 
lagged value reveals a large degree of persistence in the level of GDP per capita growth. Other 
control variables such as higher investment, educational attainment and more open economy 
increase the rate of per capita income growth. On the other hand a high inflation and population 
growth and a higher government final consumption level reduce economic growth. The model 
passes the test of absence of AR (2) in the error term and estimates are all robust. In both the cases 
the model passes the Hansen-J test. The results remain the same when the ICRG democracy index 
is replaced by Polity 2 measure of institutionalised democracy indicator (columns (3)-(4)).  
 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
We extend the analysis by estimating the equations by using Transparency International’s 
corruption perception index (CPI). The results for CPI measure in both cases (ICRG and Polity2 
democracy measure) show that the estimated coefficients for the interaction term retain the same 
sign, although the level of significance varies. The evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that 
an increase in corruption increases the level of income per capita if the country becomes more 
autocratic. However, the results are not reported here due to limited space. 
 
4.4 Marginal effect of democracy and corruption 
This subsection provides more rigorous analysis for the interaction effect between democracy and 
corruption on economic growth. The above findings show that a greater democracy does not foster 
growth in a more corrupt country. Oppositely, autocratic countries promote growth in the presence 
                                                            
12 The results are available upon request from the authors. 
of corruption. In order to interpret the impact of democracy and corruption on per capita income 
growth the marginal effects are estimated based on equations (2a and 2b). Table 4 reports the 
results of the marginal effect of democracy and corruption on per capita income at various 
percentiles (10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 95th and mean) of democracy and corruption using panel two-way 
fixed effects.  
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
For a deeper perspective, we provide the names of the countries to which these percentiles 
correspond in Table 4. The marginal effect of corruption on growth at the mean score of DEMO 
of 3.81 is 0.048. It suggests that a one standard deviation point increase in CORR increases income 
per capita by 0.05 points at the mean democracy index. As discussed earlier the impact of 
corruption shows some mixed results at different percentiles of democracy. If a country is less 
democratic then an increase in corruption is associated with greater economic growth; yet once 
past the threshold point (i.e. between 75th and 95th percentile), a higher level of corruption lowers 
growth as the economy becomes more democratic.13 Also, it is worth noting that the effect of 
corruption is significantly positive at the 10th  percentile when democratic freedom is very 
restricted (such as Togo) whereas, the effect is negative when the degree of political freedom is 
very high (above 95th percentile). For example, Finland has a mature democracy (average score of 
6) and is at the 95th percentile in the sample and it experiences negative growth if there is an 
increase in corruption level. Conversely, the results show that lowering corruption has a significant 
positive impact on economic growth in democracies. In other words, if a country is highly 
democratic then the existence of a corrupt economy reduces growth. This suggests that an anti-
corruption effort is a cure for growth if a country is highly democratic. Otherwise, a high level of 
corruption dampens growth in a democratic setting of a country like India. These empirical 
findings support the theoretical conjectures discussed in Section 2 of the paper. 
On the other hand, the marginal effect of democracy on per capita income at the mean 
corruption score of 3.0 is 0.012. This implies that a one standard deviation increase in democracy 
                                                            
13 Our results differ from Assiotis and Sylwester (2014) as the effect of corruption on growth is positive and significant 
in autocracy. 
index increases growth by 0.02 points. The result indicates that the marginal effect of democracy 
has a positive impact on growth given an average level of corruption. In particular, democracy 
enhances growth significantly only when there exists a very low levels of corruption (at the 
minimum score of corruption). For instance, Sweden has a very low corruption levels (average 
corruption score is 0.0) and a one standard deviation rise in Sweden’s democracy score, real per 
capita GDP increases by 4.31 points (3.08*1.40).  However, the effect of democracy becomes 
negative when a country is very corrupt (for example Congo Democratic Republic). The result 
suggests that democracy is a cure for growth when a country is less corrupt.  
The marginal effects are also estimated using System GMM Dynamic panel with GDP per 
capita growth as dependent variable. The threshold level for the marginal effects of corruption and 
democracy are shown in Figures 4 and 5, respectively. The threshold level for the marginal effect 
of corruption is between 3 and 4 of democracy indices suggesting that after the threshold level of 
democracy, economic growth decreases as corruption level increases. The threshold level for the 
marginal effect of corruption is a little lower than the threshold level for the marginal effect of 
democracy (between 4 and 5). The results are very similar to two-way panel fixed effects reported 
in Table 4. 
 
[FIGURE 4 AND FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
4.5 Results: autocratic countries 
This final step is to explore the channels that why and how corruption is growth-intensifying in 
autocratic countries. To answer this, the whole sample is divided into two groups based on mean 
score of Polity2 democracy index and the countries with democracy value below the mean score 
are treated as autocratic. We re-run the estimations for the autocratic countries for the period 1984–
2016 looking at our theoretical conjecture that credible commitments by the political leaders to the 
business can boost investment and in turn growth. The interaction effect of corruption and 
economic freedom on growth is estimated as Saha et al. (2009) and Faria et al. (2012) predict that 
economic freedom can enhance business activity by providing credibility to the investors. The 
results (Table 5) illustrate that coefficients on corruption are mostly positive and significant 
(columns 1, 4-5) which is consistent with our earlier results. The interaction effect is positive 
revealing that corruption may greasing the wheel if greater economic freedom is provided. 
Moreover, column 4 suggests that corruption with higher economic freedom increases growth if 
capital formation in a country is increased and the coefficient is highly significant. In other words, 
if political leaders in an autocratic country deliver credibility by providing freedom to run business 
even at the cost of sharing rents, this leads to higher investment and growth in that country. The 
result is consistent with Mullings (2018) which finds a direct effect of economic globalization on 
growth observed for the sub-sample of developing countries. The results for the subsample of 
democratic countries reveal that economic freedom is not efficient in controlling corruption and 
increasing growth for these countries (Table 6). The result is consistent with Saha et al. (2009), 
which find that economic freedom is needed more to combat corruption than political freedom. 
The case of India supports this finding as India, while being the largest democracy in the world, 
has less economic freedom than China and South Korea. 
For the robustness check, we have also selected the whole sample into autocracies (-10 to 
-6) and democracies (+6 to +10) based on Center for Systemic Peace (CSP). These results confirm 
our earlier results presented in Tables 5 and 6. However, the number of observations for the 
autocracies is very low (only 33). We have also organised the subsamples using general consensus 
that (-10 to 0) for autocracies and (1 to +10) for democracies and the results are robust and 
consistent with all three measures of autocracies and democracies defined in this study.14 
On the other channel, if a greater money supply is dechannelized from the economy due to 
a higher level of corruption, this can have a negative effect on growth by disturbing 
macroeconomic stability in autocratic countries. The coefficient for the interaction term between 
corruption and money supply is negative and significant (Column 5, Table 4) indicating that if 
autocracies (with greater monopolization of power) suffer from corrupt activities by political elites, 
this can lead to less resources resulting in negative growth and lower investment. The results 
explain that not all autocracies are growth enhancing with the presence of corruption.  
 
[TABLE 5 AND TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
 
                                                            
14 The results are available upon request from the authors. 
5. Conclusions 
A large literature has examined the effect of corruption on growth. In this paper, we examine 
whether the corruption-growth relationship is likely to be different in autocracies as compared to 
democracies. We use a panel data set of over one hundred countries, for the period 1984-2016. We 
estimate the relationship between corruption and growth using various panel estimation techniques 
including fixed effects, two-stage least square and dynamic panel-system-GMM methods. We also 
use different measures of democracy and corruption. Our results are remarkably consistent. We 
find that on average, the effect of corruption on growth is positive in autocracies as compared to 
democracies.  
Our results provide support for the so-called East Asian paradox of high corruption and 
high growth and suggest that the benign effect of corruption on growth is because of the 
authoritarian nature of the political regimes in these countries for a large duration of their 
development experience.  The political regimes in these countries gave firms confidence that the 
ruling powers will deliver on the deals that they have entered into. We present suggestive evidence 
that the key mechanism was the credible commitment of political leaders in East Asia to economic 
freedom and maintaining a pro-business environment, albeit with crony capitalist arrangements. 
On the contrary, for the average democratic countries, the effect of corruption on growth is likely 
to be strongly negative. Democratisation is likely to weaken the positive relationship between 
corruption and growth in previously autocratic countries, and the increasing wave of 
democratisation observed in the developing world suggests that corruption may be more of a threat 
to economic growth in the years ahead.   
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Table 1: Growth-corruption relationship: 1984-2016 
 ICRG Democracy Index 
 OLS (Average Over 1984-2016) 5-Year Average Panel Least Square  5-Year Average Panel Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Corruption -0.891*** 
(0.306) 
0.051 
(0.347) 
0.032 
(0.343) 
-0.0877 
(0.230) 
0.204 
(0.246) 
0.206 
(0.245) 
0.060 
(0.062) 
0.144** 
(0.073) 
0.149** 
(0.073) 
Democracy 0.089 
(0.219) 
0.497** 
(0.246) 
0.480** 
(0.245) 
0.585*** 
(0.174) 
0.625*** 
(0.182) 
0.626*** 
(0.181) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.087 
(0.056) 
0.093* 
(0.057) 
Corruption*Democracy 0.010 
(0.053) 
-0.155*** 
(0.060) 
-0.151*** 
(0.060) 
-0.097** 
(0.041) 
-0.155*** 
(0.045) 
-0.154*** 
(0.045) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.025* 
(0.054) 
-0.027* 
(0.015) 
Corruption*Democracy*East 
Asia 
  -0.052 
(0.063) 
  -0.017 
(0.016) 
  0.011** 
(0.005) 
Capital per capita  0.049*** 
(0.019) 
0.054*** 
(0.018) 
 0.031** 
(0.013) 
0.033*** 
(0.013) 
 0.283*** 
(0.054) 
0.281*** 
(0.054) 
Educational attainment  0.183*** 
(0.050) 
0.184*** 
(0.049) 
 0.145*** 
(0.037) 
0.146*** 
(0.037) 
 0.008 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
Openness/Economic Freedom  0.508*** 
(0.191) 
0.471** 
(0.195) 
 0.266* 
(0.150) 
0.258* 
(0.150) 
 0.004 
(0.003) 
0.004* 
(0.003) 
Money supply (% of GDP)  0.008*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002***(0.001) 
Constant  2.663 
(1.953) 
2.744 
(1.937) 
7.568*** 
(0.992) 
3.463*** 
(1.254) 
3.433*** 
(1.247) 
8.053*** 
(0.218) 
5.544*** 
(0.413) 
5.533*** 
(0.414) 
No. of observations 136 108 108 894 480 480 856 410 410 
Adjusted R2 0.482 0.562 0.536 0.406 0.537 0.538 0.515 0.769 0.771 
Wald statistics 102.70 55.20 47.57 99.12 47.63 42.00 24.50 32.69 30.99 
Note: Robust standard error are in parentheses with robust standard errors. ii)  ***, **, * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Table 2: Growth-corruption relationship: 1984-2016 
 Polity2 Measure of Institutionalised Democracy Index (Polity 4 Dataset) 
 OLS (Average Over 1984-2016) 5-Year Average Panel Least Square  5-Year Average Panel Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Corruption -0.590 
(0.410) 
0.452 
(0.386) 
0.453 
(0.387) 
0.085 
(0.215) 
0.153 
(0.261) 
0.155 
(0.260) 
0.022 
(0.060) 
0.144** 
(0.073) 
0.149** 
(0.073) 
Democracy 0.072 
(0.078) 
0.206*** 
(0.076) 
0.207*** 
(0.076) 
0183*** 
(0.044) 
0.146*** 
(0.058) 
0.147*** 
(0.058) 
0.024 
(0.043) 
0.087 
(0.056) 
0.093* 
(0.057) 
Corruption*Democracy -0.018 
(0.021) 
-0.064*** 
(0.020) 
-0.063*** 
(0.020) 
-0.041*** 
(0.011) 
-0.042*** 
(0.013) 
-0.042*** 
(0.013) 
-0.003 
(0.012) 
 -0.027* 
(0.015) 
Corruption*Democracy*East 
Asia 
  -0.011 
(0.014) 
  -0.004 
(0.004) 
  0.011** 
(0.005) 
Capital per capita  0.043** 
(0.018) 
0.047*** 
(0.017) 
 0.028** 
(0.014) 
0.029** 
(0.014) 
  0.281*** 
(0.054) 
Educational attainment  0.186*** 
(0.048) 
0.186*** 
(0.048) 
 0.154*** 
(0.038) 
0.153*** 
(0.038) 
  0.007 
(0.007) 
Openness/Economic Freedom  0.580*** 
(0.197) 
0.560*** 
(0.200) 
 0.278* 
(0.155) 
0.273* 
(0.155) 
  0.004* 
(0.003) 
Money supply (% of GDP)  0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
 0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
  0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Constant  0.990 
(2.094) 
0.940 
(2.077) 
7.233*** 
(0.898) 
3.872*** 
(1.351) 
3.819*** 
(1.343) 
8.158*** 
(0.211) 
5.544*** 
(0.413) 
5.533*** 
(0.414) 
No. of observations 131 104 104 856 457 457 894 410 410 
Adjusted R2 0.472 0.595 0.600 0.406 0.524 0.524 0.515 0.769 0.771 
Wald statistics 39.752 48.09 40.79 93.91 39.18 34.45 28.48 32.69 30.99 
Note: Robust standard error are in parentheses with robust standard errors. ii)  ***, **, * indicate significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Table 3: Average level of corruption and GDP per capita growth: East Asian Evidence 
 CORR GDPPCG 
China 3.35 8.85 
Hong Kong 1.68 3.49 
Mongolia 3.06 2.94 
South Korea 2.92 5.36 
Note: CORR and GDPPCG denote corruption and GDP per capita growth 
 
 
 
Table 4: The effect of democracy and corruption on growth of real GDP per capita: Marginal effect analysisa 
Marginal effects of corruption at different levels of 
democracy 
Marginal effects of democracy at different levels of 
corruption 
Percentile 
of DEM 
Value of 
DEM 
Corresponding 
country 
Estimates 
of CORR 
Percentile 
of CORR 
Value of 
CORR 
Corresponding 
country 
Estimates 
for DEM 
10th 1.5 Togo 0.106** 
(0.52) 
10th 1 Germany 0.062 
(0.042) 
25th 2.33 Cote d’Ivoire 0.085** 
(0.041) 
25th 2 Ireland 0.037 
(0.029) 
50th 4 Ecuador 0.043* 
(0.024) 
50th 3 Namibia 0.011 
(0.017) 
75th 5 Greece 0.018 
(0.020) 
75th 4 Mali -0.014 
(0.014) 
95th 6 Finland -0.008 
(0.025) 
95th 5 Haiti -0.039* 
(0.022) 
Mean 3.81 Bolivia 0.048* 
(0.025) 
Mean 3.002 Malawi 0.012 
(0.018) 
Minimum 0 Somalia 0.144** 
(0.073) 
Minimum 0 Sweden 3.0790*** 
(0.048) 
Maximum 6 Australia -0.008 
(0.025) 
Maximum 6 Congo 
Democratic 
Republic 
-0.065* 
(0.034) 
i) Robust standard error are in parentheses with robust standard errors. ii)  ***, **, * indicate significance level 
at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. iii) CORR and DEM denote corruption and democracy (ICRG democracy 
Index), respectively. 
a Two-way fixed effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Growth-corruption relationship in Autocracies: Five year average panel, 1984-2016 
 Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Corruption 0.104** 
(0.049) 
0.005 
(0.204) 
-0.019 
(0.251) 
0.935*** 
(0.344) 
0.206*** 
(0.080) 
Corruption*Economic Freedom  0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
 
Corruption*Capital per capita   0.008 
(0.029) 
-0.114** 
(0.050) 
 
Corruption*Capital per 
capita*Economic freedom 
   0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
Corruption* Money supply (% 
of GDP) 
    -0.028* 
(0.016) 
Capital per capita 0.389*** 
(0.104) 
0.383*** 
(0.103) 
0.343** 
(0.146) 
0.290** 
(0.124) 
0.410*** 
(0.097) 
Educational attainment -0.010 
(0.026) 
-0.006 
(0.025) 
-0.009 
(0.025) 
-0.026 
(0.022) 
-0.008 
(0.025) 
Economic Freedom 0.009 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
0.0178 
(0.012) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
Money supply (% of GDP) 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Constant 4.444*** 
(0.744) 
4.754*** 
(0.763) 
4.939*** 
(0.972) 
7.568*** 
(0.992) 
4.239*** 
(0.707) 
No. of observations 149 149 149 149 149 
Adjusted R2 0.741 0.742 0.741 0.793 0.748 
Wald statistics 13.09 11.99 10.82 12.73 13.79 
Note: Robust standard error are in parentheses with robust standard errors. ii)  ***, **, * indicate significance 
level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Growth-corruption relationship in Democracies: Five year average panel, 1984-2016 
 Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Corruption 0.002 
(0.016) 
-0.232** 
(0.095) 
-0.334*** 
(0.126) 
0.051 
(0.308) 
-0.252*** 
(0.064) 
Corruption*Economic Freedom  0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
 
Corruption*Capital per capita   0.025* 
(0.015) 
-0.0.024 
(0.034) 
 
Corruption*Capital per 
capita*Economic freedom 
   0.001 
(0.001) 
 
Corruption* Money supply (% 
of GDP) 
    0.064*** 
(0.014) 
Capital per capita 0.247*** 
(0.047) 
0.254*** 
(0.046) 
0.178*** 
(0.063) 
0.189** 
(0.057) 
0.223*** 
(0.045) 
Educational Attainment 0.009 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
Economic Freedom 0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Money Supply (% of GDP) 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Constant 7.966*** 
(0.224) 
7.441*** 
(0.422) 
7.778*** 
(0.494) 
7.580*** 
(0.462) 
7.054*** 
(0.333) 
No. of observations 251 251 251 251 251 
Adjusted R2 0.822 0.832 0.838 0.840 0.853 
Wald statistics 42.41 45.38 42.29 44.53 13.79 
Note: Robust standard error are in parentheses with robust standard errors. ii)  ***, **, * indicate significance 
level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table A1 Descriptive statistics (Five-year average panel) 
 GDPPC CORR DEM DEMP EDU CAPPC OPEN EF RND M2GDP 
 Mean  13491.30  3.057  3.817  14.241  9.199  3457.210  80.907  60.886  0.917  52.433 
 Median  4910.661  3.267  4.000  17.000  9.000  1439.777  69.192  61.100  0.571  40.981 
 Maximum  106791.1  6.000  6.000  21.000  16.000  24312.39  419.974  89.720  4.244  366.916 
 Minimum  143.4264  0.000  0.000  1.000  4.000 -2881.580  0.250  16.800  0.007  3.090 
 Std. Dev.  18096.42  1.286  1.599  6.666  2.164  4414.655  53.401  10.925  0.921  41.426 
           
 Observations  913  919  920  900  629  754  881  639  467  766 
 
Appendix Table A2 Data Source 
Variables Data source 
Corruption  Source from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The ICRG index 
is constructed by Political Risk Services. 
http://www.prsgroup.com/countrydata.aspx. 
Corruption perceptions index  Transparency International 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi 
Democracy Source from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The ICRG index 
is constructed by Political Risk Services. 
http://www.prsgroup.com/countrydata.aspx 
Polity 2 institutionalised democracy 
index 
Source from Polity IV Data Set 
http://www3.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/PolityIVUsersManualv2002.pdf. 
Real GDP per capita (constant 2010 
US$) 
World Bank (2017) World Development Indicators. 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
Gross capital formation (constant 
2010 US$) 
World Bank (2017) World Development Indicators. 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
Population World Bank (2017) World Development Indicators. 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
Openness (constant 2010 US$) (%)  World Bank (2017) World Development Indicators. 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
Economic freedom The Heritage Foundation 
https://www.heritage.org/index/ 
Educational attainment World Bank (2017) World Development Indicators. 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
Research and development 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
World Bank (2017) World Development Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators  
Ethnic tensions Source from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The ICRG index 
is constructed by Political Risk Services. 
http://www.prsgroup.com/countrydata.aspx. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table A3: Correlation coefficient: Five–year panel data 
  CORR*DEM CORR DEM GDPPC GDPPG LGDPPC ET 
CORR*DEM 1.000 0.551 0.354 -0.331 0.090 -0.183 0.123 
CORR 0.551 1.000 -0.530 -0.629 0.022 -0.582 0.341 
DEM 0.354 -0.530 1.000 0.450 0.078 0.507 -0.239 
GDPPC -0.331 -0.629 0.450 1.000 -0.059 0.825 -0.335 
GDPPCG 0.090 0.022 0.078 -0.059 1.000 0.006 -0.072 
LGDPPC -0.183 -0.582 0.507 0.825 0.006 1.000 -0.441 
ET 0.123 0.341 -0.239 -0.335 -0.072 -0.441 1.000 
Note: CORR is corruption, DEM is democracy, GDPPC is GDP per capita, GDPPCG is GDP per capita growth, 
LGDPPC is log GDP per capita and ET is ethnic tension. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4: Corruption, democracy and growth using System GMM: 1984-2016 
Dependent variable - annual 
growth rate of real GDP per 
capita 
ICRG democracy 
index 
(1) 
ICRG democracy 
index 
(2) 
Polity 2 measure 
of democracy 
index 
(3) 
Polity 2 measure 
of democracy 
index 
(4) 
     
Lagged real GDP per capita 
growth 
0.2082** 
(2.33) 
0.1801** 
(1.97) 
0.5624* 
(1.64) 
0.3598*** 
(3.23) 
Corruption 2.0519 
(1.48) 
3.4074** 
(2.00) 
0.9881 
(1.12) 
2.5785* 
(1.93) 
Democracy 2.3899** 
(2.46) 
3.0790*** 
(2.61) 
0.2793 
(1.56) 
0.7059** 
(2.44) 
Corruption*Democracy -0.5535* 
(1.79) 
-0.7190** 
(1.99) 
-0.0910* 
(1.84) 
-0.1633** 
(1.95) 
Educational attainment  0.0133 
(0.39) 
 0.0124 
(0.27) 
Govt. exp. (% of GDP)  -1.4668 
(1.49) 
 -2.1579 
(0.94) 
Openness/Economic freedom  1.0570 
(0.42) 
 2.2746 
(1.05) 
Population growth  -0.3926 
(0.76) 
 0.9463 
(0.94) 
Capital per capita  0.1050 
(1.09) 
 -0.0188 
(0.22) 
Inflation  -0.2948 
(0.56) 
 0.0654 
(0.32) 
Constant -8.5705* 
(1.84) 
-22.1940 
(1.60) 
 -22.5699 
(1.64) 
     
Autocorrell (1) p-values 
Autocorrell (2) 
(0.020) 
(0.436) 
(0.021) 
(0.636) 
(0.058) 
(0.841) 
(0.001) 
(0.875) 
 
Hansen J-statistic 
(p-value) 
(0.119) 
Robust 
(0.181) 
Robust 
0.230 
Robust 
(0.447) 
Robust 
Wald Statistic 
(p-value) 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of countries 136 134 104 103 
No. Of observations 3579 3517 2667 2636 
i) t-statistics are in parentheses with robust standard errors. ii)  ***, **, * indicate significance level at the 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively. 
Note: Annual panel data is used to avoid less number of observations due to various lag instruments used in the 
estimation. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of democracy in China, India, South Korea and Zimbabwe 
 
Note: We use the Polity 2 measure of democracy. We re-scale the measure from -10 to +10 to 0 to 20, with higher 
values of the measure capturing higher levels of democracy. A score of 0 to 10 implies autocracy while a score of 
10 to 20 implies democracy. India has always been a democracy from 1965 to 2017, South Korea briefly from 
1965 to 1970, and then from 1987 onwards. China has never been a democracy. Zimbabwe was under autocracy 
since mid-80s till end of 2010. 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
 
Figure 2: Corruption and per capita GDP growth: China, India, South Korea and Zimbabwe 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
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Figure 3: Kernel fit plots for the relationship between corruption, democracy and growth 
 
3a: Relationship between corruption and growth 
 
 
 
 
3b: Relationship between democracy and growth 
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Figure 4 Marginal effect of corruption on growth 
 
Note: higher values of the democracy measure indicate greater democracy. 
 
Figure 5 Marginal effect of democracy on growth 
 
Note: higher values of the corruption measure indicate higher corruption. 
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